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ABSTRACT
Essays on Healthcare Access, Use, and Cost Containment
by
Jerome Alexander Dugan
This dissertation is composed of two essays that examine the role of public and
private health insurance on healthcare access, use, and cost containment.
In Chapter 1, Dugan, Virani, and Ho (2012) examine the impact of Medicare
eligibility on healthcare utilization and access. Although Medicare eligibility has been
shown to generally increase health care utilization, few studies have examined these
relationships among the chronically ill. We use a regression-discontinuity framework
to compare physician utilization and financial access to care among people before and
after the Medicare eligibility threshold at age 65. Specifically, we focus on coronary
heart disease and stroke (CHDS) patients. We find that Medicare eligibility improves
health care access and physician utilization for many adults with CHDS, but it may
not promote appropriate levels of physician use among blacks with CHDS.
My second chapter examines the extent to which the managed care backlash af-
fected managed care’s ability to contain hospital costs among short-term, non-federal
hospitals between 1998 and 2008. My analysis focuses on health maintenance orga-
nizations (HMOs), the most aggressive managed care model. Unlike previous studies
that use cross-sectional or fixed effects estimators to address the endogeneity of HMO
penetration with respect to hospital costs, this study uses a fixed effects instrumental
variable approach. The results suggest two conclusions. First, I find the impact of
increased HMO penetration on costs declined over the study period, suggesting reg-
ulation adversely impacted managed care’s ability to contain hospital costs. Second,
when costs are decomposed into unit costs by hospital service, I find the impact of
increased HMO penetration on inpatient costs reversed over the study period, but
HMOs were still effective at containing outpatient costs.
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1Introduction
In the United States, rising health expenditures represent a significant challenge to
our long-term national prosperity. According to the Centers for Medicare and Medi-
caid Services, National Health Expenditures (NHE) as a fraction of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) has grown from 7% in 1970 to almost 18% of the economy in 2008.
Even if the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services program expenditures (e.g.,
Medicare, Medicaid, and Children’s Health Insurance Program) are excluded, NHE
as a fraction of GDP still grow from 6% to almost 11% during the same time pe-
riod. Along with a rapidly aging population and mandates for improving health
quality, runaway health expenditures are the most significant contributor to the na-
tion’s deficit. Thus, the challenge of any deficit reduction plan is to decrease NHE
without impacting the quality of healthcare services delivered. This dissertation is
composed of two essays that examine the role of public and private health insurance
on healthcare access, use, and cost containment.
In Chapter 1, Dugan, Virani, and Ho (2012) examine changes in healthcare access
and utilization associated with Medicare eligibility among adults with coronary heart
disease and stroke (CHDS). Descriptive statistics and regression discontinuity analysis
were used to examine healthcare access and utilization at the Medicare eligibility
threshold at age 65 for 176,611 National Health Interview Survey respondents aged
55-74 surveyed between 1997 and 2010. We found that adults with CHDS reported
a higher propensity to make one or more office-based physician visits at age 65 than
adults with no other major chronic disease (MCD). Adults with CHDS also reported
2greater reductions in cost as a barrier to care at age 65 than adults with no MCD.
The subgroup analysis revealed that Hispanics and highly educated adults with CHDS
reported the highest propensity to make two or more office visits at age 65. However,
blacks with CHDS reported a decline in their propensity to make two or more office
visits at age 65. Medicare eligibility improves healthcare access and utilization for
many adults with CHDS, but it may not promote appropriate levels of physician use
among some groups.
Consumer dissatisfaction with the quality and limitations of managed health care
led to rapid disenrollment from managed care plans and demands for regulation be-
tween 1998 and 2003. Managed care companies, particularly health maintenance
organizations (HMOs), now face a regulatory environment that restricts them from
using their most aggressive strategies for managing costs. Chapter 2 examines the
extent to which this backlash affected managed care’s ability to contain costs among
short-term, non-federal hospitals. Fixed effects and instrumental variables estimation
were used to address the potential endogeneity of HMO penetration with respect to
hospital costs.
The results suggest two conclusions. First, I find the impact of increased HMO
penetration on costs declined over the study period, suggesting regulation adversely
impacted managed care’s ability to contain hospital costs. Second, when costs are
decomposed into unit costs by hospital service, I find the impact of increased HMO
penetration on inpatient costs reversed over the study period. HMOs were still effec-
tive at containing outpatient costs.
3Chapter 1
Medicare Eligibility and Physician Utilization
Among Adults with Coronary Heart Disease and
Stroke
1.1 Introduction
Coronary heart disease and stroke are the two largest components of cardiovascular
disease (CVD), the leading cause of disability and death in the United States. Of the
831,804 CVD-related deaths in 2007, 406,351 (49%) involved coronary heart disease
and 227,215 (27%) involved stroke (Roger et al., 2011). Following an acute event, the
management of either coronary heart disease or stroke requires continual monitoring
and oftentimes treatment involving costly procedures and medications.
For these patients, health insurance plays a crucial role in managing their condition
and improving health outcomes. Approximately 16% of adults aged 45-64 in the
United States are uninsured, as compared with 2% of adults aged 65 years and older
(DeNavas-Walt et al., 2011). This inequality in coverage is largely attributed to
Medicare eligibility rules which give adults access to generous coverage at age 65.
Previous studies examining the impact of Medicare on health outcomes have shown
that Medicare eligibility contributes to reductions in cost as a financial barrier to care
and increased utilization of health care services (Decker and Rapaport, 2002; Card,
Dobkin, and Maestas, 2008; Bhattacharya and Lakdawalla, 2005; Lichtenberg, 2002;
4McWilliams et al., 2003). Further, these studies showed that populations covered
by Medicare benefit substantially from Medicare coverage, as measured by health
outcomes and utilization. However, few studies report health outcomes and utilization
for patients with known morbidities, and we know of no such studies for CVD (Decker
and Rapaport, 2002). Using a nationally representative data set, this study examines
the impact of Medicare eligibility on healthcare access and utilization among adults
with CVD which includes coronary heart disease and stroke (CHDS).1
We found that adults with CHDS reported a higher propensity to make one or
more office-based physician visits at age 65 than adults with no major chronic disease
(MCD). Adults with CHDS also reported greater reductions in cost as a barrier to care
at age 65 than adults without MCD. The subgroup analysis revealed that Hispanics
and highly educated adults with CHDS reported the highest propensity to make two
or more office visits at age 65. However, blacks with CHDS reported a decline in their
propensity to make two or more office visits at age 65. Overall, Medicare eligibility
improves healthcare access and utilization for many adults with CHDS, but it may
not promote appropriate levels of physician use among some groups.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the econo-
metric framework. The data are summarized in Section 3 and the results are presented
in Section 4. The final sections conclude and discuss policy implications.
1The results in this chapter have been published. Citation: Dugan, Virani, and Ho (2012).
51.2 Econometric Framework
Establishing the casual relationship between health insurance and the use of health
care services is complicated by the endogeneity of health insurance. Since individuals
are not randomly assigned health insurance, factors, such as health status, may lead
to self-selection bias. One way to resolve this self-selection problem is to use the
exogenous variation generated by Medicare eligibility rules.
Our identification strategy uses a regression discontinuity (RD) design to examine
the impact of turning age 65 (Card et al., 2008). That is, most people become eligible
for Medicare coverage when they reach age 65, creating a discrete change in coverage
at that age (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2010; Social Security
Administration, 2008). Regression Discontinuity analysis uses discrete changes like
this to identify the intended effect of an endogenous mechanism (Imbens and Lemieux,
2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2011).
1.2.1 Regression Discontinuity Design
Let Yi,t be a measure of healthcare utilization or access to care for individual i in
survey year t:
Y i,t = βAgei,t + γDi + δXi,t + µi,t (1.1)
where Age denotes the age of individual i, X is a set of individual covariates, and µ
is an unobserved error component. D is a dummy variable which indicates Medicare
eligibility: one if the respondent was aged 65 and older at the time of the survey
or zero otherwise. When age is included as an additional explanatory variable, the
6estimated coefficient on the Medicare eligibility indicator becomes a RD term which
captures the effect of Medicare coverage.
Regression discontinuity regressions were estimated by ordinary least squares for
each health status group, then by health status and race/ethnicity or educational
attainment. Along with age, we control for several individual characteristics, which
include, quadratic age, sex, race/ethnicity, educational attainment, geographic region,
and survey year. Some controls for educational attainment or race/ethnicity may be
excluded depending on the subgroup being analyzed. We used sampling weights to
adjust for oversampling. The standard errors were clustered by age groups to account
for interclass correlation arising from the degenerative effects of aging.
1.3 Data
The National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), administered by the U.S. Census Bu-
reau and maintained by the National Center for Health Statistics, is a population-
based, cross-sectional survey of the civilian, noninstitutionalized U.S. population.
Each year approximately 40,000 households (roughly 100,000 individuals) are ques-
tioned about their medical history and sociodemographic characteristics which im-
pact health. We used data from the 1997-2010 core NHIS survey (sample-adult and
person-level files) to create a data set of adults aged 55-74.
71.3.1 Physician Utilization
The primary outcome variables were physician visits, access to care, and supplemental
insurance coverage. In the NHIS survey, a categorical question was used to assess
how frequently each respondent used physician services. Respondents were asked
how many times in the past year they saw a doctor or other health care professional
about their health at a doctors office, a clinic, or some other place. One or more
office visits was chosen to proxy for basic access and use of non-emergency physician
services. Two or more office visits was chosen to proxy for a schedule of care required
to routinely monitor CVD risk factors (e.g., weight, blood pressure, cholesterol, and
blood glucose levels) to avoid future acute events.
1.3.2 Access to Care
Respondents were identified as having financial barriers to access care in the past
year if medical care was delayed because of worry about the cost or if medical care
was not received because of affordability problems. Respondents with two or more
forms of health insurance were identified as having supplemental insurance coverage.
1.3.3 Health Status Groups
Respondents were assigned to one of three health status groups: diagnosed with
CHDS, diagnosed with a major chronic disease (MCD) other than CHDS, or diag-
nosed with no MCD. A CHDS diagnosis was assigned if the respondent was told by
a doctor or other health professional that that they had coronary heart disease, a
heart attack, angina pectoris, or a stroke. A MCD other than CHDS diagnosis was
8determined if the respondent was told by a doctor or other health professional that
they had chronic pulmonary disease, diabetes, or cancer (Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention, 2004). In this study, chronic pulmonary disease was defined as
having chronic bronchitis, emphysema, or chronic asthma. Individuals who were not
informed they had a MCD were identified as having no MCD. Adults diagnosed with
a major chronic disease other than CHDS were excluded from the analysis.
Our decision to aggregate coronary heart disease and stroke into one reporting
group was based on the fact that coronary heart disease and stroke share the same
pathophysiology. Coronary heart disease and stroke are two distinct diseases, but
they have overlapping atherosclerotic disease mechanisms and similar risk prediction
algorithms (D’Agostino et al., 2008; Kim and Johnston, 2011). While the treatment
for both diseases may vary substantially in their acute phase, follow-up care focuses
on monitoring related risk factors like hypertension, diabetes, and elevated cholesterol
levels. We therefore assumed that both diseases have the same patterns of physician
monitoring; however, it may be the case that the influence of each risk factor is
different for the two diseases in such a way that monitoring varies (Pendlebury et al.,
2004).
Respondents who self-identified as Hispanic or Latino were identified as Hispanic
regardless of race. Whites and blacks with no Hispanic or Latino ancestry were
identified as white non-Hispanic (white) and black non-Hispanic (black), respectively.
All other respondents were identified as “Other.” In this study, we focused our
subgroup analysis on the three largest race/ethnic categories: Hispanic, white and
black.
91.3.4 Measuring Socioeconomic Status
Income was reported as a categorical variable in the NHIS survey. A cross-sectional
analysis would not be limited by this categorical measurement; however, because
of inflation, these categories change over time. Thus, the income cutoffs cannot be
matched from year to year. In the labor economics literature, educational attainment
has been used as a substitute for income (Card, 1995). Education can be a better
measure of socioeconomic status because it measures socioeconomic status before old
age entitlement programs, i.e., Medicare and Social Security, impact income (Bhat-
tacharya and Lakdawalla, 2005). Respondents with less than 12 years of education
or a general education degree were identified as high school dropouts. Respondents
with a high school diploma were categorized as high school graduates and respondents
with any post-secondary education (for any duration) were categorized as having some
college experience.
Summary statistics for physician use and access to care were tabulated for each
health status group by race/ethnicity, or educational attainment. We used respon-
dents aged 60-64 and 65-69 to generate baseline levels of pre/post-Medicare access to
care and utilization, respectively. For each subgroup, adults with CHDS and adults
without MCD were compared using two-sample t-tests. Medicare coverage rates by
age were graphed for adults with CHDS and adults without MCD. This figure allowed
us to summarize Medicare coverage rates before and after age 65 and clearly identified
the resulting discontinuities.
10
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Main Results
Summary statistics are reported in Table 1.1. The pooled NHIS data set contained
200,248 respondents aged 55-74 surveyed between 1997 and 2010. The mean age of
this sample was 63. Females comprised slightly over half of the sample at 54%, and
whites represented 69% of the sample. Just over 45% of respondents reported having
at least some college experience. In this study, we limit our analysis to adults with
CHDS and adults without MCD. This left us with 176,611 respondents: 15,945 with
CHDS and 160,666 without MCD. Summary statistics for each subgroup were also
reported. Sample counts by health status group, race, and education are reported in
Appendix Table A.1.
We assumed that both coronary heart disease and stroke have the same patterns of
physician monitoring. In support of this assumption, we compared the propensity to
use physician services for coronary heart disease and stroke at the Medicare eligibility
threshold. We found no evidence to suggest that patterns of use varied between the
health status groups (Appendix Table A.2). Figure 1.1 presents Medicare coverage
rates by age for each health status group. The graph shows that adults with CHDS
were more likely to have Medicare coverage than adults without MCD at every age.
Before age 65, these differences could be well over 20%. The important feature of this
graph is that it demonstrates the Medicare eligibility age rule generates a discrete
jump in coverage at age 65. Full Medicare coverage uptake was not observed at
age 65, because some individuals choose not to enroll due to access to other forms
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of comprehensive insurance (Card, Dobkin, and Maestas, 2008). Additional figures
describing Medicare coverage by subgroup are reported (Figure A.1).
Baseline utilization and RD estimates are presented in Table 1.2. Overall, adults
with CHDS had a higher propensity to make one or more office-based visits prior to
Medicare eligibility (94.9%) relative to adults without MCD (84.0%). Adults with
CHDS also had a higher propensity to make two or more office-based visits (88.2%)
than adults without MCD (66.4%). Blacks with CHDS had the highest propensity to
make two or more office visits (90.4%), and Hispanics without MCD had the lowest
propensity to make two or more office visits (55.7%).
In general, the RD estimates show an increased propensity to make one or more
and two or more office-based visits. At age 65, adults with CHDS increased their
propensity to make one or more office visits by 1.7% (p=0.03) relative to their younger
counterparts. This increase is in addition to the higher likelihood of adults with CHDS
making one or more office visits prior to age 65. Among adults without MCD, only
high school dropouts reported statistically significant increase in their propensity to
make two or more office visits at age 65 (2.4%, p=0.01). Hispanics with CHDS and
adults with some college experience with CHDS also reported an increased propensity
to make two or more office visits at age 65 (9.5%, p=0.04 and 2.4%, p<0.01). Blacks
with CHDS decreased their propensity to make two or more office visits at age 65
(-2.1%, p=0.05). Baseline access to care and supplemental insurance coverage and
RD estimates are shown in Table 1.3. Overall, 8.6% of adults without MCD reported
barriers to care, while adults with CHDS report much higher rates at 15.5%. Blacks,
low-educated adults, and Hispanics with CHDS reported the highest barriers to access
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care at 21.9%, 18.9%, and 17.8%, respectively. Seven-point-two percent of adults
without MCD reported having supplemental coverage while adults with CHDS report
much higher rates at 20.2%. Blacks and high school dropouts reported the highest
rates of supplemental coverage at 21.3% and 23.7%, respectively. Hispanics reported
the lowest rate of supplemental coverage at 12.0%.
At age 65, adults with CHDS reported a greater reduction in barriers to care
at age 65 for adults with CHDS (-3.6%, p<0.01), relative to adults without MCD
(-2.0%, p=0.01). Although Hispanics reported the largest increase in propensity to
make visits, blacks reported the greatest decline in barriers to care at age 65 (7.3%,
p=0.03). For Hispanics and blacks with CHDS, these declines in barriers to care were
due to relatively high financial difficulties in obtaining care prior to age 65. The RD
estimates show a substantial increase in supplemental insurance coverage across all
groups at age 65.
1.4.2 Robustness
We estimated three alternative specifications (Appendix Table A.3 and Appendix
Table A.4). First, we test to robustness of the finding that blacks and Hispanics with
CHDS decreased or increased their propensity to make two or more physician visits
at age 65, by examining interactions between race/ethnicity and education. We verify
our results are robust to interactions between race and educational attainment.
Second, the robustness of the results to the included controls was investigated
by limiting the right-hand-side variables to the RD term, quadratic age, and survey
years. By excluding most individual characteristics from the model, we verified that
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no single variable drives the results. Next, the robustness of the results to the age
bandwidth selected was investigated by restricting our window of analysis to adults
aged 60-69. Doing so allowed us to verify the consistency of the estimates over different
age windows. In this specification, we were able to verify the sign and magnitude of
the results for blacks with CHDS, but we were unable to find statistical significance.
This may be due to the fact that under a shorter age window, subgroup samples were
too small to make meaningful inferences.
1.5 Conclusion
While previous studies have examined the impact of Medicare eligibility on the use of
health care services, relatively few studies have investigated this association among
the chronically ill (Decker and Rapaport, 2002; Card, Dobkin, and Maestas, 2008).
This study is the first to estimate the impact of Medicare eligibility at age 65 on
healthcare access and utilization for the two largest components of cardiovascular
disease, coronary heart disease and stroke. The results of this study contributes to
our understanding of the appropriate use of physician services among adults with
CHDS and the extent to which Medicare eligibility impacts disparities in health care
access and utilization.
Our main results show that prior to age 65, adults with CHDS were more likely
to quality for Medicare than adults without MCD. These results are consistent with
early Medicare eligibility guidelines which allow persons diagnosed with chronic heart
failure, myocardial infarctions, ischemic heart disease, arrhythmias, congenital heart
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defects, angina pectoris, and valve defects to apply for supplemental security income
(SSI) or social security disability (SSD) benefits (U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, 2010). Being diagnosed with one of the named conditions does
not guarantee acceptance into the SSI or SSD programs; however, individuals with
advanced conditions are more likely to gain entry, which is consistent with the data
presented.
A discrete jump in insurance coverage, as a result of Medicare eligibility rules,
allowed us to use RD methods to estimate the impact of Medicare coverage on health
care access and use. We found that Medicare eligibility increased the propensity
for adults to make one or more office-based visits, decreased barriers to care, and
increased the propensity for adults to have supplemental insurance coverage relative
to adults just under age 65. Minorities with CHDS reported the greatest declines in
barriers to care, although these declines were due to higher baseline levels of financial
difficulties.
Conversely, some socioeconomically disadvantaged adults with CHDS appeared
to seek frequent care from physicians at a lower rate than comparable patients who
had not reached age 65. For blacks with CHDS, reaching Medicare eligibility led to
statistically significant declines in their propensity to make two or more office visits.
On the other hand, Hispanics with CHDS report the largest rise in their propensity
to make two or more office visits. These results differed significantly from the results
for white and highly educated adults. There are a number of possible explanations
for both findings.
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First, economic models of the demand for health insurance tell us that households
which anticipate credit constraints in the future are expected to become more risk
averse (Schnewider, 2004). These credit constraints are often the result of income
and health status shocks that increase demand for insurance. For those who are poor
or suffering from a chronic disease, costly care can drive up insurance premiums to
unaffordable levels, leaving many individuals underinsured.
Compared to the general population, blacks are disproportionally poor and af-
fected by cardiovascular disease. Further, for blacks with CHDS, underinsurance
is evidenced by the sharp increase in supplemental insurance coverage disparities
between subgroups. Their lack of supplemental insurance coverage make them re-
sponsible for both the Medicare Part B deductible, 20% of the cost for each physician
medical visit, and approved medication (Card, Dobkin, and Maestas, 2008; Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, 2004). Thus, the various forms of cost-sharing in
Medicare may still lead socioeconomically disadvantaged persons to curtail utilization
on the margin.
Another explanation may be attributed to whites and highly educated patients’
ability to better utilize Medicare. Disparities in health care utilization between racial
and educational groups have been studied extensively (Decker and Rapaport, 2002;
Card, Dobkin, and Maestas, 2008; Gornick et al., 1996; Gornick, 2003; Dunlop et
al., 2002; Sudore et al., 2006; Rooks et al., 2002), with several studies examining
utilization within fully insured populations (Virani et al., 2011; Peterson et al., 2008;
Groeneveld, Heidenreich, and Garber, 2003; Pilote et al., 2003; Groeneveld et al.,
2007; Rooks et al., 2007). Racial and socioeconomic differences in the use of CVD
16
hospital procedures within insured populations are still seen (Virani et al., 2011; Pe-
terson et al., 2008; Jha et al., 2003). Disparities in outcomes appear to be minimized
in the Veteran’s Affairs system of equal health care access (Pilote et al., 2003; Groen-
eveld et al., 2007). Less is known about disparities in preventative care in similar
environments (Virani et al., 2011; Peterson et al., 2008). Understanding these dis-
parities is crucial to minimizing future acute events (Virani et al., 2011; Peterson et
al., 2008; Jha et al., 2003).
Higher treatment rates for Hispanic Medicare patients relative to blacks have been
identified in inpatient care (Cromwell et al., 2005; Eggers and Greenburg, 1998). In
particular, Cromwell and his coauthors found that white patients admitted for is-
chemic heart disease had the highest rates of invasive procedures, blacks had the
lowest, and Hispanics were in between (Cromwell et al., 2005). Furthermore, the
jump in utilization at age 65 for Hispanics may be attributable to the large disparity
in health insurance coverage between non-elderly Hispanics and non-Hispanics (Rut-
ledge and McLaughlin, 2008). Additional analysis generally confirms these trends
(Appendix Table A.5 and Appendix Table A.6).
Our study contributes to the literature by demonstrating the role that Medi-
care plays in improving health care access for adults with CHDS and the potential
weakness in the program for blacks. Insurance status and financial concerns about
accessing care have been found to play a crucial role in the timing of care for heart
attack patients (Smolderen et al., 2010). Declining use of routine services at age
65 highlights a need for policies which ensure that adults with CHDS receive routine
monitoring of CVD risk factors. Expansions of Medicaid under the new federal health
17
care reform law may create one vital source of supplemental insurance coverage. For
the most disadvantaged Medicare beneficiaries who also qualify for Medicaid, or dual
eligibles, researchers have found that dual eligible blacks used more office-based physi-
cian services than whites (Moon and Shin, 2006). Apart from insurance, some racial
groups may still not be able to get good quality care if they lack access to transporta-
tion to make it to their appointment, access to a land line or cell phone to schedule
an appointment, or a support system to help them make it to their appointments.
Future research should focus on examining how supplemental insurance and these
additional constraints impact health care access and use.
There are several limitations to the interpretation of these results. First, respon-
dents to the NHIS survey are sampled every year, such that our inferences regarding
the effects of Medicare eligibility are drawn from annual cohorts of persons at each age,
rather than from repeated observations of the same individuals as they age. Second,
our estimates for physician use focus on office visits, which may lead to underestima-
tion of utilization if patients substitute emergency room visits for office visits. We
examine the use of emergency care and find similar patterns of utilization (Appendix
Table A.7). However, since health care utilization measures are recorded as categor-
ical variables, we are unable to create global measures of utilization. Additionally,
our models assume the only major event that occurs at age 65 is Medicare eligibility,
but other events, e.g., retirement, may also occur. We include employment status as
an additional control and find our results are robust to its inclusion (Appendix Table
A.8). These retirements may bias our results, but it is more likely that substantial
discontinuities exist for every year after age 62 (the earliest possible retirement age
18
for Social Security). Last, we cannot rule out the possibility that the decline in two
or more office visits per year for blacks with CHDS reflects better management of
disease symptoms with medications or access to better physicians due to Medicare
coverage. However, nine of the twelve years of data in our sample are years prior to
the implementation of Medicare Part D in 2006, so this is less likely an issue.
Given that reaching Medicare eligibility is associated with reductions in the fre-
quent use of physician services for blacks with CHDS, future studies should investigate
the underlying causes of this decline. The decline in multiple annual visits could be
the result of improved care under Medicare, but it might also reflect shortcomings in
the Medicare program for socioeconomically disadvantaged patients with CVD.
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Figure 1.1 : Medicare coverage rates in respondents by age and health status
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Table 1.1 : Summary Statistics
All National Health Respondents Respondents
Interview Survey with no major with coronary heart
Variable Respondents chronic disease disease and stroke
Age 63.1 62.8 65.2
(0.0) N=200,248 (0.0) N=160,666 (0.0) N=15,945
Female 53.5 53.2 46.0
(0.0) N=107,051 (0.0) N=85,519 (0.0) N=7,341
White 69.4 67.0 71.2
(0.0) N=138,946 (0.0) N=110,838 (0.0) N=11,358
Black 12.4 11.9 14.9
(0.0) N=24,880 (0.0) N=19,154 (0.0) N=2,375
Hispanic 13.3 13.6 10.3
(0.0) N=26,076 (0.0) N=21,808 (0.0) N=1,641
High school dropout 25.1 23.7 35.0
(0.0) N=57,372 (0.0) N=36,429 (0.0) N=5,532
High school graduate 29.8 30.3 27.0
(0.0) N=57,372 (0.0) N=46,499 (0.0) N=4,259
At least some college 45.2 46.0 38.0
(0.0) N=87,161 (0.0) N=70,636 (0.0) N=6,007
Standard deviations in parentheses. All values specified as percentages unless oth-
erwise noted. Mean differences for the two health status groups were generally
significant at the 1% confidence level.
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Table A.2 : RD estimates† at age 65 for office-based physician visits and emergency
visits for adults diagnosed with coronary heart disease and stroke with p-values
Office Visits (2+) Emergency Visits (2+)
Heart Disease Stroke Heart Disease Stroke
Overall Sample 1.6 1.1 1.6* -0.2
[0.13] [0.29] [0.04] [0.56]
N=15,543 N=15,543 N=15,633 N=15,633
By Ethnicity:
Whites 1.4 0.4 2.7** 0.7
[0.21] [0.24] [p<0.01] [0.27]
N=11,098 N=11,098 N=11,159 N=11,159
Blacks -2.5 -1.9 -8.1* -7.6
[0.29] [0.24] [0.05] [0.23]
N=2,304 N=2,304 N=2,318 N=2,318
Hispanics 9.2* 10.4 -1.5 0.8
[0.02] [0.17] [0.81] [0.76]
N=1,590 N=1,590 N=1,602 N=1,602
By Education:
High school dropout 2.6 0.3 0.5 0.3
[0.17] [0.91] [0.57] [0.87]
N=5,437 N=5,437 N=5,476 N=5,476
High school graduate -0.6 0.2 2.2* 0.9
[0.97] [0.64] [0.04] [0.47]
N=4,192 N=4,192 N=4,215 N=4,215
At least some college 2.3** 2.9** 1.3 -2.2**
[0.01] [p<0.01] [0.27] [0.01]
N=5,914 N=5,914 N=5,942 N=5,942
† All estimates were weighted to adjust for oversampling and the standard errors
were clustered by age groups. A stroke variable was included independently in
the regression model and interacted with the regression discontinuity indicator
variable. The linear combination of the two regression discontinuity terms gives
an estimate of the impact of Medicare eligibility on health care use.
* Statistically significant at the 5% confidence level; ** Statistically significant
at the 1% confidence level.
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Table A.3 : RD estimates† at age 65 for office-based physician visits for adults diag-
nosed with coronary heart disease and stroke with p-values
Dependent Variable: Office Based Visits (2+)
High School High School Reports at Least
Dropouts Graduates Some College
Overall Sample 1.1 0.12 2.7**
[0.40] [0.90] [0.01]
N=15,576 N=15,576 N=15,576
By Ethnicity:
Whites -0.7 -0.3 2.5
[0.67] [0.79] [0.06]
N=11,125 N=11,125 N=11,125
Blacks -2.7* -1.3 -2.0**
[0.03] [0.41] [0.01]
N=2,307 N=2,307 N=2,307
Hispanics 9.0* 8.6 11.5**
[0.05] [0.20] [0.01]
N=1,592 N=1,592 N=1,592
† All estimates were weighted to adjust for oversampling and
the standard errors were clustered by age groups. High school
dropouts and respondents with some college experience are in-
teracted with the regression discontinuity indicator variable.
High school graduates are the excluded category. The linear
combination of the regression discontinuity variable and the in-
teracted high school dropout variable gives an estimate of the
impact of Medicare eligibility on health care use among high
school dropouts. The linear combination of the regression dis-
continuity variable and the interacted college experience vari-
able gives an estimate of the impact of Medicare eligibility on
health care use among respondents with at least some college
experience.
* Statistically significant at the 5% confidence level; ** Sta-
tistically significant at the 1% confidence level.
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Table A.8 : RD estimates† at age 65 for office-based physician visits after controlling
for employment status with p-values and sample size
Office Visits (1+) Office Visits (2+)
No Major Coronary No Major Coronary
Chronic Heart Disease Chronic Heart Disease
Disease and Stroke Disease and Stroke
Overall Sample 0.3 1.6* 0.4 1.0
[0.20] [0.05] [0.60] [0.23]
N=55,280 N=15,516 N=55,280 N=15,516
By Ethnicity:
Whites 0.1* 1.3* 0.5 0.8
[0.05] [0.04] [0.63] [0.33]
N=39,329 N=11,086 N=39,329 N=11,086
Blacks 1.6 0.9 0.7 -2.8**
[0.18] [0.21] [0.66] [0.01]
N=7,070 N=2,299 N=7,070 N=2,299
Hispanics 2.6 8.0 1.3 8.7
[0.33] [0.06] [0.61] [0.06]
N=6,452 N=1,580 N=6,452 N=1,580
By Education:
High school dropout 3.0 1.8 1.2* 1.4
[0.09] [0.26] [0.03] [0.44]
N=12,291 N=5,430 N=12,291 N=5,430
High school graduate -0.9 2.6* 0.8 -0.3
[0.20] [0.01] [0.26] [0.80]
N=16,231 N=4,182 N=16,231 N=4,182
At least some college -0.2 0.8 -0.4 2.0**
[0.77] [0.06] [0.80] [0.01]
N=26,758 N=5,904 N=26,758 N=5,904
† All estimates were weighted to adjust for oversampling and the standard errors
were clustered by age groups. Employment status was included as an additional
control in this specification.
* Statistically significant at the 5% confidence level; ** Statistically significant
at the 1% confidence level.
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Chapter 2
The Managed Care Backlash and Hospital Cost
Containment
2.1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed large changes in the organization, financing, and delivery
of healthcare in the U.S. as Americans have shifted away from traditional insurance
and into managed care plans. Researchers largely attributed this shift to managed
care’s ability to address market failures associated with patients “shopping” for med-
ical care.1 Consumer dissatisfaction with the quality and limitations of managed care
has led to rapid disenrollment from managed care plans and demand for regulation
between 1998 and 2003. Managed care plans now face quality and coverage mandates
that restrict them from using their most aggressive cost controls. This has led many
to question managed care’s ability to curb medical cost growth.
1The “shopping problem” refers generally to the market failures which occur as a result of
consumers relying on healthcare providers to advise them on treatment (Dranove, 2000). Under
a traditional insurance environment, where medical services are unbundled and reimbursed sepa-
rately on a fee-for-service basis, healthcare providers have an incentive to prescribe unnecessary or
marginally beneficial treatments to patients since their profits are linked to volume. To address
this issue, indemnity plans rely on patient cost sharing (i.e., copayments, deductibles) to limit the
consumer’s demand for healthcare services. Unlike indemnity plans which focus on patient cost
sharing, managed care uses provider incentives (i.e., selective contracting, capitation, gatekeeping)
to curb the provision of healthcare services.
40
Past studies have examined the effects of managed care penetration on Medicare
expenditures (Baker and Courts, 1996; Baker, 1997; Chernew et al., 2008), as well as
the impact of increased managed care penetration on overall market activity with pos-
itive results(Robinson 1991, 1996; Melnick and Zwanziger, 1995; Gaskin and Hadley,
1997; Bamezai et al. 1999; Shen and Melnick, 2004). More recently, researchers have
focused their attention to examining managed care’s ability to contain costs since the
managed care backlash (Shen and Melnick, 2006; Dranove et al., 2008; Konetzka et
al., 2008; Shen, Wu, and Melnick, 2010); however, these studies may not fully control
for the potential endogeneity of HMO penetration with respect to provider costs.2
This paper examines the extent to which this backlash affected managed care’s
ability to contain hospital costs among short-term, non-federal hospitals between 1998
and 2008. This time period is an ideal environment to test whether cost containment
varies with increased managed care activity because it overlaps with both the man-
aged care backlash period (1998-2003) and the post-backlash period (2004-2008). My
analysis focuses on HMOs, the most aggressive managed care model. Unlike previous
studies that use cross-sectional or fixed effects estimators to address the endogeneity
of HMO penetration with respect to hospital costs, this study uses a fixed effects
instrumental variable (IV) approach.
2Shen and Melnick (2006) and Shen, Wu, and Melnick (2010) are the exceptions as they report
instrumental variables (IV) results or offer explanations for not using IV. Shen, Wu, and Melnick
(2010) suggest previous instruments (i.e., labor market characteristics) might have been valid instru-
ments during managed care’s growth period, but current changes in HMOs are more likely driven
by consumer demand factors related to consumer experiences with HMOs and the backlash.
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The results suggest two conclusions. First, I found that the impact of increased
HMO penetration on total hospital costs declined over the study period. Specifically,
a 10% increase in HMO penetration was associated with a 0.3% decline in total costs
during the backlash. Post-backlash, the same 10% increase was associated with a 0.6%
increase in total costs. After adjusting for endogeneity, these results were insignificant.
Second, the unit cost analysis revealed a similar decline in cost containment over the
study period; however, a reversal did not occur for outpatient costs. The IV results
showed that a 10% increase in HMO penetration resulted in a statistically significant
2.0% increase in inpatient costs per discharge and an 8.1% decline in outpatient costs
per visit. Post-backlash, the same 10% increase in HMO penetration was associated
with an 8.0% increase in inpatient costs per discharge and a 5.5% decline in outpatient
costs per visit. Although managed care’s ability to contain hospital costs appears to
have declined over the study period, these results suggest that HMOs are still a
valuable cost containment device for outpatient services.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the litera-
ture and Section 2.3 presents the conceptual framework. The econometric framework
is presented in Section 2.4. The data are summarized in Section 2.5 and the results are
presented in Section 2.6. The final sections conclude and discuss policy implications.
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2.2 Background
2.2.1 Managed Care and Cost Containment
A substantial empirical literature has found that managed care enrollees have lower
costs and utilization as compared to traditional indemnity insurance enrollees (Miller
and Luft, 1994, 1997, 2002). In addition, increased managed care activity has been
found to impact overall market activity through three main channels: slowing the
diffusion of technology (Mas and Seinfeld, 2008; Bokhari, 2009), impacting the level
and quality of hospital staffing (Mark, Harless, and McCue, 2005), and altering med-
ical practice patterns that affects both managed care and non-managed care enrollees
(Baker 1997, 1999; Baker and Courts, 1996; Baker and McClellan, 2001; Heidenreich
et al., 2002; Bradford and Krumholz, 2003; Chernew, DeCicca, and Town, 2008).
Researchers have estimated managed care’s impact on medical expenditures with
varying results. For example, Baker and his coauthors examine the impact of Medicare
HMO penetration on fee-for-service (FFS) healthcare expenditures using data from
the late 1980s and early 1990s (Baker, 1997, 1999; Baker and Shankarkumar, 1997).
Using data from 1990-1994, Baker and Shankarkumar (1997) show that a 10% increase
in Medicare HMO market share (from 10% to 20% HMO market share) resulted in
a 2% decline in expenditures. Their IV results suggested an even higher level of
cost containment. A recent study by Chernew, DeCicca, and Town (2008) use data
from 1994-2001 and IV to show that a 1% increase in county-level Medicare HMO
penetration is associated with nearly a 1% reduction in annual spending.
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2.2.2 The Managed Care Backlash
An important development in healthcare in the U.S. is the substitution of indemnity
insurance plans for managed care arrangements such as HMOs and preferred provider
organizations (PPOs). Researchers attribute the rise of managed care, in particular
HMOs, to their use of provider incentives to resolve market failures related to “the
shopping” problem. Over time, concerns about the quality and limitations of managed
care led to widespread distrust among consumers and policymakers. According to
Figure 1, HMO and Medicare Advantage (MA) enrollments fell from 21% and 13% to
17% and 9% between 1998 and 2003, respectively. Any willing provider and freedom
of choice laws passed during this time period allowed providers who met minimum
standards to be eligible to treat HMO enrollees, limited managed care’s ability to
use selective contracting to negotiate profitable reimbursement rates, and allowed
consumers to choose their own providers. Both the decline in enrollment and passage
of managed care regulation between 1998 and 2003 has been labeled as a backlash in
response to HMO efforts to restrict utilization of healthcare services using provider
incentives.3 Recently, researchers have focused their attention to measuring managed
care’s ability to contain provider cost since the backlash (Shen and Melnick, 2006;
Dranove et al, 2008; Konetzka et al., 2008; Shen, Wu, and Melnick, 2010).
3Also during this backlash, less restrictive forms of managed care (i.e., PPOs) flourished, state
governments passed consumer and provider protection regulation that opened hospital networks and
imposed minimum coverage standards, and increased hospital bargaining power limited managed
care’s position in contract negotiations (Shen and Melnick, 2006).
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In one of the most comprehensive studies to date, Shen, Wu, and Melnick (2010)
find that a 10% increase in HMO enrollment was associated with a 4.1% reduction in
total operating costs from 1994 to 1999. This time period, defined as the pre-backlash
period, also showed that markets with low HMO penetration had a 10% increase in
HMO enrollments, resulting in a 5.5% reduction in costs. In markets with high
penetration, a 10% increase in HMO enrollments results in a 5% drop in operating
cost. Between 2000 and 2005, the time period defined as the post-backlash period, a
10% rise in HMO penetration was associated with a 2.5% decline in operating costs
among hospitals.
Previous studies have documented a decline in HMOs’ ability to contain costs
since the late 1990s, but these studies have been unable to determine the post back-
lash performance of HMOs due to the lack of data (Shen and Melnick, 2004, 2006;
Konetzka et al., 2008; Dranove et al., 2008; Shen, Wu, and Melnick, 2010). The anal-
ysis of total hospital costs provide broad descriptions of overall hospital performance,
but knowledge of unit costs is required for planning budgets, measuring efficiency,
and establishing a schedule of charges for patient services (Shepard, Hodgkin, and
Anthony, 2000; Friedman, Wong, and Steiner, 2006). To date, the analysis of HMOs’
impact on hospital unit costs has been sparse (Konetzka et al., 2008). Understand-
ing HMOs’ ability to contain costs is important for understanding HMOs’ impact on
overall hospital performance, the efficiency of health interventions, and the continuing
role HMOs should play in future hospital cost containment policy.
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2.3 Conceptual Framework
2.3.1 Hospital Cost Model
Hospital costs may be viewed as a function of many factors: service volume, quality
of service, scope of services, factor prices, and production efficiency.4 In general, total
hospital costs TotalCosts can be summarized by the following reduced form equation:
TotalCosts =
n∑
i=0
cijk(Volumeij,Wagesij,HMOPenk,Xij) +  (2.1)
where c represents the cost of hospital service i at hospital j in county k. Volume
represents volume for hospital service i. Wages represents hospital wages. HMOPen
represents the fraction of the county population enrolled in a managed care plan. Let
X represent other characteristics which affect the cost of care. Last,  is a disturbance
term. Equation (2.1) will be used to estimate the impact of the backlash on managed
care’s ability to contain hospital costs.
Managed care promotes efficiency in a number of ways. As part of the selective
contracting process, HMOs exchange patient volume to negotiate lower prices from
providers. As a consequence, a cost advantage may result from scale economies gen-
erated from increased patient volume. Provisions that use primary care physicians
as a gatekeeper to authorize the use of healthcare services limit overall utilization,
especially the use of medical hospital services. In addition, increased HMO activity
4Studies that examine hospital cost and production efficiency typically utilize a cost function
analysis; however, estimating a cost function for hospitals is complicated by a lack of data on capital
factors (Jensen and Morrisey, 1986; Zwanziger and Melnick, 1988). Following others, I estimate a
reduced form cost equation using a wage index that relates each hospital’s local hourly wages to
national averages (Shen and Melnick, 2006; Konetska et al., 2008; Shen, Wu, and Melnick, 2010).
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at the market level can stimulate price competition among providers in order to nego-
tiate lower prices (Baker, 1997; Konetska et al., 2008; Shen, Wu, and Melnick, 2010),
limit the diffusion of expensive medical technology which can impact the intensity of
hospital service (Mas and Seinfeld, 2008; Bokhari, 2009), and impact the level and
quality of hospital staffing (Mark, Harless, and McCue, 2005).
2.3.2 Estimation Issues
There are several issues to be considered when estimating the cost equation, eq.
(2.1). First, there may be unobservable factors that are correlated with both HMO
penetration and hospital costs. For example, since HMOs base their entry decisions
and activity level on hospital cost growth, the use of any HMO penetration measure
may result in biased estimates of the impact of increased HMO penetration on hospital
costs.5 A second challenge to interpreting the empirical results is the timing of the
managed care backlash. Marquis, Rogowski and Escarce (2004) identify the beginning
of the managed care backlash period as 1998. A later study by Konetzka et al. (2008)
identifies the post-backlash period as beginning in 1997. Yet another study by Shen,
Wu, and Melnick (2010) select the year 2000 as the beginning of the managed care
backlash. Last, the limited availability of good data on managed care means that
the largest component of managed care (e.g., PPOs) are not controlled for in most
analyses (Bamezai et al., 1999; Shen, Wu, Melnick, 2008).
5Other sources of endogeneity may be considered. For example, hospital consolidations may
decrease HMO activity and increase hospital costs (Chernew et al., 2008). On the other hand,
preferences of patients and providers for conservative care might increase HMO activity and decrease
hospital costs (Baker, 1997).
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2.4 Econometric Framework
2.4.1 Basic Model
The conceptual framework suggests that the impact of increased HMO penetration
on hospital costs may decline following the backlash, however, the exact magnitude
of the backlash is ambiguous. Accordingly, I estimate fixed effects models of the
following form:
Log(TotalCosts)jkt = αj +γt+β1HMOPenkt+β2Bt×HMOPenkt+β3Xjt+µjkt (2.2)
where TotalCosts represents total hospital accounting costs of hospital j located in
county k in time period t.6 HMOPen represents the fraction of individuals enrolled
in an HMO in county c in year t. αj represent unobservable effects that vary by
hospital and γt represent time fixed-effects. Bt is an indicator variable that takes
on a value of 1 after 2004. Xjt represents observable characteristics of hospital j
in period t. These include hospital volumes (e.g., inpatient discharges, outpatient
visits), capacity, wages, case mix, organizational structure, patient distribution (e.g.,
Medicare, Medicaid), and variables correlated with the demand for hospital services
(e.g., per capita income). Last, µjkt is a disturbance term.
6Hospital costs are also decomposed into unit costs by hospital service (i.e., inpatient costs per
discharge and outpatient costs per visit). To date, the analysis of HMOs’ impact on costs by hospital
service has been sparse: Baker (1997, 1999) examines aggregate Medicare Part A & B expenditures
while Konetzka et al. (2008) examine outpatient units. This study represents an improvement over
earlier studies due to its assessment of managed care’s impact on total and unit costs.
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The coefficient β1 in eq. (2.2) captures the effect of HMO penetration on hospital
cost during the backlash period (1998-2003). The coefficient β2 is an interaction term
between the post-backlash indicator and HMO penetration. The linear combination
of β1 and β2 captures the effect of managed care penetration on hospital cost in the
post-backlash period (2004-2008). Following others (Baker, 1997; Shen, Wu, and
Melnick, 2010), the reported regression coefficients were adjusted to reflect a 10%
increase in managed care penetration. Therefore, the impact of a 10% increase in
HMO penetration on hospital costs during the backlash (1998-2003) is captured by
regression coefficient β1 in eq. (2.2) and the impact of a 10% increase in HMO
penetration on hospital costs during post-backlash (2004-2008) is captured by the
linear combination of β1 and β2 in eq. (2.2).
2.4.2 Instrumental Variables
Since HMO penetration and hospital costs are potentially endogenous, the fixed effects
model described in eq. (2.2) will not render consistent estimates for β1 and β2.
To identify the effect of increased HMO penetration on hospital costs, I use fixed
effects IV estimation.7 The fixed effects IV model is identified by four exclusion
restrictions: state “any willing provider” laws, state “freedom of choice” laws, the
unemployment rate, and firms with 25 or more employees are assumed to directly
affect HMO penetration but not hospital costs.
7With a standard exogeneity assumption, i.e. E(uit|ai, bi) = 0, Wooldridge (2005) shows that
the fixed effects estimator consistently estimates the population parameter. If this assumption does
not hold, but an appropriate set of instruments can be found, i.e. E(uit|zi, ai, bi) = 0, Murtazashvili
and Wooldridge (2008) show that the fixed effects IV estimator is consistent.
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The first stage effect of regulation on HMO penetration is possible because the
passage or reform “any willing provider” and “freedom of choice” laws limited man-
aged care’s ability to negotiate profitable reimbursement rates. Therefore, the passage
and reform of managed care regulation would disproportionally impact MCOs that
rely heavily on selective contracting and gatekeeping to contain costs (i.e., HMOs),
but would benefit more lenient forms of managed care (i.e., PPOs).8
The HMO Act of 1997 requires employers who offered health care benefits to offer
managed care plans as an alternative to indemnity insurance. Employers who meet
the following criteria fall under this Act: having 25 or more employees, are within
the service area of a federally qualified HMO, are paying at least minimum wage, and
offer a health plan to their employees. The county-level unemployment rate is used
as an instrument for HMO penetration, because most individuals in the U.S. receive
their insurance through an employer, and most employers offer some form of managed
care insurance as a consequence of the HMO Act of 1973.9
8Appendix Table B.1 reports the results of the impact instruments on the log managed care plans.
The passage or reform of an “any willing provider” or “freedom of choice” law had a negative impact
on the number of HMO plans: the fraction of HMO plans declined 8.3% and 9.7%, respectively. As
expected, the passage of an “any willing provider” law had no effect on the number of PPO plans,
but the passage of a “freedom of choice” law lead to a 19.5% increase in the fraction of PPO plans.
9Although the “dual choice” provision was removed by 1995, the first stage regression results
presented in Appendix Table B.1 suggest the two labor market instruments are still significant
determinants of HMO penetration.
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2.5 The Data
2.5.1 Hospital Costs
Hospital costs among all short-term, non-federal hospitals in the U.S. were calculated
using accounting data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Studies (CMS)
Hospital Cost Reports. The base year for the study is 1998, the beginning of the
backlash, and the final years is 2008, the most recent year comprehensive data are
available. Hospital costs were adjusted to reflect 2008 dollars using the U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index (CPI). Observations were designated as
outliers if (1) they fell below the 1st percentile or above the 99th percentile or (2)
their year-to-year growth fell below the 1st or above the 99th percentile.
Unit costs by hospital service were also calculated. First, total hospital costs were
decomposed into service costs by multiplying total inpatient (outpatient) charges
by the hospital’s annual cost-to-charge ratio, respectively. Next, total service costs
were divided by total inpatient discharges and total outpatient visits, respectively.
According to Table 2.1, mean total hospital costs, inpatient costs per discharge, and
outpatient costs per visit were $90.2 million, $7198.4, and $308.6 in 1998, respectively.
Between 1999 - 2003, hospital costs grew at an accelerated rate. By 2004, cost growth
had slowed and declined between 2004 - 2007. Outpatient cost growth remained high.
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2.5.2 Managed Care Penetration
Managed care penetration rates were calculated using HMO enrollment data from
HealthLeaders Interstudy. Hospital markets are defined at the county level. There-
fore, HMO penetration is defined as the proportion of the county’s population enrolled
in a private or public (i.e., Medicare, Medicaid) HMO plan. According to Table 2.1,
mean HMO penetration was 21.3% in 1998, declined between 1999 and 2003, and by
2004 reversed their decline. However, by 2008 HMO penetration was 16.8%.
2.5.3 Instrumental Variables
As mentioned before, employers who meet the following criteria fall under the HMO
Act of 1973: having 25 or more employees, are within the service area of a federally
qualified HMO, are paying at least minimum wage, and offer a indemnity health plan
to their employees. Due to the categorical nature of the County Business Patterns
File, the fraction of companies with 20 or more employees was used. County-level un-
employment rates are obtained from the Area Resource File (ARF). Data on passage
of state-level “any willing provider” and “freedom of choice” regulation were obtained
from the National Council of State Legislatures’ State Laws Report.
2.5.4 Hospital Market Power
The hospital’s bargaining position is an important determinate of the negotiated
reimbursement rates between HMOs and hospitals. In this study, the degree of com-
petition faced by each hospital was calculated as a Herfindahl Index, the sum of
squared market shares. Hospital bargaining power is based on hospital discharges
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from the American Hospital Association Annual Surveys.
2.5.5 Other Controls
Other control variables include hospital ownership, bed counts, teaching status, CMS
case mix, Medicare and Medicaid share of discharges, total inpatient discharges, to-
tal inpatient discharges squared, total outpatient visits, and total outpatient visits
squared. Real per capita income, adjusted to reflect 2008 dollars using the U.S. Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics CPI, is included to control for medical demand. The CMS
Wage Index proxies for labor input prices. Table 2.2 summarizes these variables.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Hospital Cost Estimates
Table 2.3 presents the main results from the fixed effects and IV models estimating
the impact of HMO penetration on hospital costs. After controlling for covariates, a
finding that the coefficient β1 (or the combination β1 + β2) from eq. (2.2) are negative
are consistent with the hypothesis that hospitals are generally responding to HMO
cost containment efforts during the backlash (post-backlash) period, respectively.
The fixed effects estimates are reported in the first three columns of Table 2.3.
Overall, a 10% increase in HMO penetration is associated with a statistically signif-
icant 0.3% reduction in total hospital cost, a 0.4% reduction in inpatient costs per
discharge, and a 1.9% reduction in outpatient costs per visit during the managed care
backlash period. Post-backlash, there is no measurable amount of cost containment
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for total hospital costs and inpatient costs per discharge: the same 10% increase in
HMO penetration was associated with a 0.6% increase in total hospital cost and a
1.3% increase in inpatient costs per discharge. Compared to inpatient cost results,
there was a modest decline in HMOs’ impact on outpatient costs.
The next three columns in Table 2.3 report the IV estimates. During the backlash
and post-backlash periods there was no measurable, statistically significant amount
of cost containment for total hospital costs.10 Overall, the unit cost analyses showed
that a 10% increase in HMO penetration resulted in a 2.0% increase in inpatient
costs per discharge and an 8.1% decline in outpatient costs per visit. Post-backlash,
the same 10% increase in HMO penetration was associated with an 8.0% increase in
inpatient costs per discharge and a 5.5% decline in outpatient costs per visit.
2.6.2 Alternative Specifications
The results of two alternative specifications are reported in Table 2.4. First, to test
the robustness of the results to alternative measures of managed care penetration,
models that include both HMO penetration and MA penetration were estimated.
While MA penetration does not measure overall PPO penetration, it is the best
measure of overall managed care penetration available. These results are similar to
the fixed effects results. Second, to verify missing observations are not driving the
10Appendix Table B.2 reports the first stage results. There are different first stage estimates
for each regression since the sample size varies for each cost measure. The instruments are jointly
significant at the 1% significance level. In addition, the signs of the coefficients of the instruments
were strong and statistically significant at the 1% significance level for each cost measure. In par-
ticular, the passage of an “any willing provider” (“freedom of choice”) law results in a 2% decline
(4% increase) in HMO penetration, respectively. A 1% increase in county unemployment results
in a 0.7% decline in HMO penetration and a 1% increase in the fraction of firms with 20 or more
employees results in a 1.7% increase in HMO penetration.
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results, models that include hospitals present throughout the entire study period are
estimated.11 These results are consistent with the main results.
2.7 Discussion
The previous section presented estimates of the impact of the backlash on HMOs
ability to contain hospital costs. Two estimators and three cost models were used, but
all estimates suggest the same conclusion: the impact of increased HMO penetration
on costs declined over the study period. These results are interesting for two reasons.
The first is that the IV estimates are larger than the fixed effects estimates. The
second is that the impact of HMO penetration on inpatient costs reversed over the
study period, but HMOs were still effective at containing outpatient costs.
2.7.1 Larger IV Estimates
Relative to the fixed effects results, the IV estimates point to a larger effect of in-
creased HMO penetration on hospital costs. This may be due to several reasons.
First, although the IV estimates are significantly significant different from zero, it
is unclear whether they are statistically different from the fixed effects estimates. If
HMO penetration is not endogenous, the fixed effects estimates are preferred since
the estimator has lower variance. This is unlikely the case since the results of the
Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests for the inpatient and outpatient models rejects the null
11In addition, I test the data for unit roots using the Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002) panel unit root
test, where the null hypothesis is that all the panels contain a unit root (Appendix Table B.3). In
each model the Levin-Lin-Chu test rejects the null hypothesis that the panels contain unit roots.
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hypothesis that the fixed effects and IV estimates are the same (Table 2.3). The
hypothesis is just barely accepted for the total cost model.
Second, it may be the case that some instruments may be correlated with hospi-
tal costs, thus violating our exclusion restrictions in a way that biases the estimates
upward. Several identification tests are utilized to investigate the validity of the in-
struments (Table 2.3). The Hansen J-test tests if the over-identifying restrictions
are valid, where the null is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error
term. A failure to reject the null hypothesis implies that the instruments are exoge-
nous. The Hansen J-test for each model fail to reject the null hypothesis that the
over-identifying instruments are invalid. Because there are more instruments than
the number of potentially endogenous variables, we can test over-identifying restric-
tions. The Kleibergen-Paap (KP) Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test tests for under-
identification and the KP Wald F -test tests for weak identification. The KP LM
statistic for each model rejects the null that the model is under-identified and the KP
Wald F -test for each model rejects the null that the instrumental variables are weak.
Last, since hospital networks allow patients to seek care at hospitals located out-
side their county of residence, HMO penetration measures based on county HMO
enrollments only will underestimate actual HMO activity. In the presence of this
type of measurement error, the fixed effects results are biased towards zero.
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2.7.2 Differential Impact on Costs
It comes at no surprise that HMOs are effective at controlling outpatient costs as the
waste associated with the delivery of outpatient care is well documented (McKinsey
Global Institute, 2008). It is unclear why there was a reversal for inpatient care.
There are a several possible explanations for the inpatient costs result.
First, rising inpatient costs may be partially due to increased use of expensive
technology, higher labor costs, and hospital consolidation. For example, Friedman,
Wong and Steiner (2006) used discharge data for the nine leading groups of admissions
from 1998 to 2001 and found that increased HMO penetration restrained admission
rates, but neither the initial level nor the change in the HMO market penetration
had a significant association with inpatient costs.12 Second, mandated expansions of
benefits during the backlash may result in a less healthy, more costly mix of members
through adverse selection (Mays, Hurley, and Grossman, 2003).
On the other hand, benefit expansions can increase demand for medical care, and
thus increase costs. Goldman et al. (1995) use survey and claims data to examine the
cost implications of the Department of Defense’s decision to replace a traditional FFS
policy with two managed care alternatives. A notable feature of the new health policy
was the decision to expand the benefits available to military health care beneficiaries.
They found that utilization and medical costs, both inpatient and outpatient costs,
were higher under the new managed care policy compared to the old FFS policy.
12Admissions: acute myocardial infarction; coronary atherosclerosis; complication of device, im-
plant, or graft; spondylosis, intervertebral disc disorders; cardiac dysrhythmias; osteoarthritis; res-
piratory failure, insufficiency; congestive heart failure, nonhypertensive; and nonspecific chest pain.
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2.8 Conclusion
The expensive and rising level of healthcare spending in the U.S. has led to sus-
tained interest in developing institutions for addressing the cost drivers of healthcare
delivery. Managed care’s use of provider incentives to address the “shopping prob-
lem” represented a major step in controlling runaway medical cost growth throughout
the 1980s and early 1990s. Unfortunately, consumer dissatisfaction with the quality
and limitations of managed care led to an organized backlash against managed care.
Following this backlash, MCOs, particularly HMOs, now face quality and coverage
mandates which restrict them from using their most aggressive cost controls. Previ-
ous studies have documented a decline in HMOs’ ability to contain costs since the
backlash; however, these studies are complicated by a lack of data and endogeneity.
The goal of this paper has been to address these limitations using current data
and the regulatory backlash against managed care as a source of identifying variation
in my hospital cost models. The fixed effects results suggest modest cost savings,
with a reversal in cost containment following the backlash. On the other hand, the
unit cost and IV results show some interesting results. In particular, HMOs were
still effective at containing outpatient costs, although the impact of increased HMO
penetration on inpatient costs reversed over the study period.
The negative impact of the backlash on managed care’s ability to contain hospi-
tal costs may have important policy implications. For instance, an important policy
question is to what extent Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) may slow cost
growth. ACOs are the latest wave of cost containment institutions and vary from
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MCOs in their structure (Gold, 2010); however, both MCOs and ACOs rely on the
same provider incentives to lower costs and improve efficiency. Given that the ag-
gressive use of provider incentives led to a backlash against managed care in the
late 1990s, too much focus on provider incentives in ACOs could result in a similar
backlash (Tollen and Crane, 2002).
Further work should focus on understanding the backlash’s impact on quality,
looking at patients by diagnosis group and considering how the backlash impacted
their treatment patterns, adherence behavior, and survival.
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Figure 2.1 : Trend in Managed Care Penetration
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Table 2.1 : Summary Statistics: Trends in Hospital Costs and HMO Activity
A. Hospital Costs B. HMO Activity
Total Unit Cost by Hospital Service HMO
Year Costs Inpatient Outpatient Penetration
1998 $90.2 - $7198.4 - $308.6 - 21.3% -
1999 $93.4 3.6% $7284.4 1.2% $309.1 0.2% 22.3% 1.0%
2000 $94.9 1.6% $7306.5 0.3% $303.5 -1.8% 21.7% -0.6%
2001 $98.0 3.3% $7485.5 2.5% $318.1 4.8% 20.9% -0.8%
2002 $98.7 0.8% $7924.8 5.9% $330.7 4.0% 18.6% -2.3%
2003 $93.3 0.6% $8218.7 3.7% $347.2 5.0% 17.4% -1.2%
2004 $98.8 -0.5% $8516.4 3.6% $366.2 5.5% 16.0% -1.4%
2005 $94.2 -4.6% $8860.1 4.0% $383.8 4.8% 17.0% 1.0%
2006 $96.3 2.2% $8977.7 1.3% $400.1 4.3% 18.9% 1.9%
2007 $99.2 3.1% $9012.0 0.4% $426.2 6.5% 17.3% -1.6%
2008 $97.2 -2.0% $9069.9 0.6% $420.3 -1.4% 16.8% -0.5%
Total 7.8% 26.0% 36.2% -5.0%
Sample means and growth rates are reported. All costs were adjusted to reflect
2008 dollars using the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI.
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Table 2.2 : Summary Statistics: Independent and Instrumental Variables
Standard
Variable Mean Deviation Source
Independent Variables
Hospital Herfendahl-Hirshman index 49.9 (37.3) AHA
Medicare case mix index 1.3 (0.3) CMS
Total inpatient discharges (#, in 1000s) 6.5 (7.3) AHA
Total outpatient visits (#, in 1000s) 93.5 (116.5) AHA
Wage index 1.0 (0.2) CMS
Hospital beds (#, number) 140.3 (133.1) AHA
Medicare discharges (%) 44.0 (18.8) CMS
Medicaid discharges (%) 14.2 (11.8) CMS
For-profit ownership (%) 21.0 (40.8) AHA
Government Ownership (%) 22.3 (41.6) AHA
Real per capita Income ($, in 1000s) 26.4 (10.1) ARF
Instrumental Variables
Freedom of choice (#, laws) 0.5 (0.6) NCSL
Any willing provider (#, laws) 0.6 (0.8) NCSL
Firms with ≥ 20 employees (%) 12.8 (3.4) CBP
County unemployment rate (%) 5.2 (2.1) ARF
Sources: American Hospital Association (AHA); Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Studies (CMS); National Conference of State Legislatures
(NCSL); Area Resource File (ARF); County Business Patterns (CBP).
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Table B.1 : Estimated Effect of HMO Penetration on Log Managed Care Plans
HMO PPO
Plans Plans
Freedom of choice (#, laws) -0.097* 0.195***
(0.059) (0.038)
Any willing provider (#, laws) -0.083** -0.032
(0.038) (0.00)
County unemployment rate (%) -0.023** -0.011
(0.012) (0.008)
Firms with ≥ 20 employees (%) 0.10*** 0.109***
(0.009) (0.006)
R2 0.14 0.20
Number of Observations 45244 50522
Number of Counties 1990 2370
The dependent variable is HMO Penetration. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. Regressions include time
trends. * significant at the 10% confidence level; ** sig-
nificant at the 5% confidence level; *** significant at the
1% confidence level.
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Table B.2 : First Stage Results
Total Unit Costs by Hospital Service
Costs Inpatient Outpatient
Freedom of choice (#, laws) 3.845*** 3.833*** 4.168***
(0.519) (0.535) (0.518)
Any willing provider (#, laws) -1.976*** -1.968*** -1.879***
(0.438) (0.436) (0.437)
County unemployment rate (%) -0.696*** -0.707*** -0.726***
(0.053) (0.053) (0.054)
Firms with ≥ 20 employees (%) 1.752*** 1.764*** 1.663***
(0.565) (0.572) (0.557)
R2 0.14 0.14 0.14
Number of Observations 32400 32927 32426
Number of Hospitals 3411 3424 3402
F -test of excluded instruments 65.84*** 67.82*** 67.17***
There are different first stage estimates for each cost regression since the
sample size varies by the cost measure used. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. All regressions include hospital controls, county controls, and
time trends. * significant at the 10% confidence level; ** significant at the
5% confidence level; *** significant at the 1% confidence level.
69
Table B.3 : Unit Root Tests
Total Unit Costs by Hospital Service
Costs Inpatient Outpatient
Levin-Lin-Chu Statistic -26.250*** -81.817*** -118.610***
Number of Panels 2438 2438 2438
Number of Periods 11 11 11
Observations 24380 24380 24380
Each test includes a constant term to capture hospital fixed effects.
* significant at the 10% confidence level; ** significant at the 5%
confidence level; *** significant at the 1% confidence level.
